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Abstract. The fishing activities within the English Channel may be regarded as various components of one large multi-
species multi-gear multi-area fishery. As a result of a bioeconomic analysis of this fishery, significant differences in 
profitability between activities were outlined. According to industrial economics, such differences may be regarded as the 
result of barriers to entry limiting the access to the most profitable activities. The aim of this paper is to determine which 
part of the differences of profitability outlined in the survey can be explained by usual barriers to entry (geographical, 
technical, institutional, informational), and which part should be attributed to other factors, such as non monetary 
arguments of the utility function of producers. It is based on a socio-economic survey of 160 French fishermen. The interest 
of this analysis is both theoretical and practical: on one side, it intends to provide some new evidence in the debate 
concerning the economic rationality of fishermen; on the other side, it helps to identify the range of remote constraints 
fishery management has to cope with. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Developed in the fifties in North America, fishery theory 
mobilizes the results of the neoclassical microeconomic 
theory to explain the fishers’ behavior. On the traditional 
assumption of perfect mobility and perfect information, 
producers based their strategies on the principle of profit 
maximization. As a result, they allocate their inputs in 
the fishing activities
1 that offer the best profitability, until 
the equalization of the levels of profitability (Gordon, 
1954). In the long run the well-known result of this 
behavior in open-access is over-capacity and over-
exploitation, which account for managers intervening 
(Scott, 1955). 
 
However, in the fishery economics literature several 
works have questioned the validity of this profit 
maximization hypothesis, stressing the fact that the 
models that referred to it obtained mistaken results 
(Smith, 1981; Gatewood and McCay, 1990; Frost et al., 
1993).  
 
                                                        
1 A fishing activity is defined here as the association of 
the gear used, the area fished and the species or group of 
species targeted. 
Yet, knowing the behavior of individual fisherman and 
predicting the aggregate fishing effort among alternative 
fishing activities is fundamental from a management 
point of view, especially in a multi-species, multi-gear, 
multi-area fishery. This preoccupation has conducted to a 
piece of literature on modeling individual fishing activity 
choice and entry-exit decisions (see for example, 
Bocksteal and Opaluch, 1983; Sampson, 1992; Holland 
and Sutinen, 1999; Latouche and Le Floch, 2000). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to see what has taken place 
in the English Channel fishery. Due to the strong 
biological, technical and economic interactions between 
the various fishing activities in this area, the whole 
Channel may be regarded as one large multi-country, 
multi-gear and multi-species fishery, rather than a 
number of separate fisheries geographically co-located. 
Therefore, in this fishery, each producer can allocate his 
means of production in any of the 53 activities identified.  
 
As a part of a bioeconomic analysis of this fishery, a 
socio-economic survey was conducted, in order to assess 
the economic performance. One result of this survey is 
the existence of permanent differences of profitability 
between fishing activities, which leads to a number of 
“unprofitable situations” and brings into question the 
validity of the traditional assumptions presented above   IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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(part 1). The aim of the paper is then to determine which 
part of these so-called “unprofitable situations” can be 
explained by different forms of barriers to entry inside 
the traditional economic framework (part 2). A 
discussion will take place about the theoretical issue of 
this research on the producers’ behavior, as well as about 
the nature of barriers to entry on which the fishery 
manager could act to achieve a more efficient 
exploitation (part 3). 
 
 
2- THE PROBLEM: THE EXISTENCE OF 
PERMANENT DIFFERENCES OF 
PROFITABILITY BETWEEN FISHING 
ACTIVITIES INSIDE A COMPLEX FISHERY. 
 
2.1 The English Channel fishery. 
 
The English Channel fishery (ICES areas VIId and VIIe)  
is commercially exploited by fishing boats of several 
European countries. The fleet is composed of nearly 4000 
boats. Most of them are small inshore units having 
several activities. Their size can vary from 6 meters to 
more than 30 meters. Almost 75 species are 
commercially exploited (Tétard et al., 1995). The boats 
present different exploitation strategies, which can vary 
according to their size, their location or their main 
activity. For most of them, their annual performances 
will depend on the practice of several distinguished 
activities along the year. As a result, the average level of 
polyvalence per boat is 2.5 activities a year (Tétard, 
op.cit.), and each entrepreneur has to choose, at a trip 
level, one single activity between 53 available.  
 
Given the lack of data, this analysis only involves the 
French part of the Channel. In 1994, the French fleet was 
composed of 1674 units, from 6 to 25 meters long, 
accounting for 35 % of the national production for the 
fresh fish market. As usual in the small scale fisheries, 
it’s a heterogeneous fleet, in terms of structure of 
production as well as in terms of exploitation strategy. 
Boats are thus gathered in sub-fleets (noted fleets in the 
rest of the text), based on three criteria: size of the boats, 
location port and main activities. Inside each of these 
fleets, the boats are assumed to be homogeneous.  
 
There are three main interests in gathering fishing boats 
into fleets. First, this allows us to define a smallest 
number of entities likely to be studied and managed 
individually. Secondly, this notion is closer to the 
traditional economic concept of activity sector (sum of 
production units having similar main activity). Last, but 
not least, it’s not necessary to get information about the 
individual behavior. A group’s behavior can be modeled 
following traditional economic principles, even if each 
person behaves differently. This, however, implies that 
the above-mentioned groups must be built so that the 
internal variability is reduced to a minimum. 
 
Three class sizes have been selected: less than 10 meters, 
10 to 16 meters and 16 to 25 meters. This segmentation 
is justified by the fact that these size limits are 
discriminating as for the geographical range of fishing of 
the boats (Berthou, 1997). Taking into account the 
physical differences between boats belonging to each size 
class, all the comparison between activities’ profitability 
will take place inside each size class. In the rest of this 
paper, the analyze will focus on the 10 to 16 meters class 
size.  
 
As the English Channel is mainly an inshore fishery, the 
port’s location takes an important place in the analysis. 
Six areas were then identified, in order to take into 
account the geographical, legislative and biological 
specificities of the littoral: maritime districts of Brest and 
Morlaix (B1), Paimpol and de Saint-Brieuc (B2), Saint-
Malo and Ouest-Cotentin (B3), Est-Cotentin, Caen and 
Le Havre (B4), Fécamp and Dieppe (B5), and Boulogne 
(B6) (See the map in Appendix).  
 
Nine (sub)fleets were identified, which present a 
significant level of homogeneity: trawlers, trawler-
dredgers, other dredgers, netters, netter-potters, potters, 
whelkers, seaweeders, liners. These fleets are based on 
the criteria of similar pattern of activity. 
 
The English Channel fishery is mainly a “ small scale” 
one, from the point of view of the financial structure of 
the firm. This particularity has two important 
consequences for our problem. On one hand, it implies 
that the owner of the capital works onboard as the 
skipper, choosing the allocation of the input, as any 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur. Regarding the traditional 
distinction made by the theory, there is then a confusion 
between the functions of entrepreneur and owner. This 
allows us to deal easily with the question of who has the 
decisional power in the firm. Also objectives conflicts 
pointed by the managerial economics are not likely to 
exist in this case (Cyert and March 1963). 
 
In the other hand, it implies to precise the notion of 
profit. Traditionally, the economic profit is derived from 
the concept of Full Equity Profit (gross margin net of 
depreciation cost). The rate of return on capital, or rate of 
profit, is then a classic indicator of economic profitability 
that is sometimes used for the analysis of economic 
performance in the fishing industry (Davidse et al 1997). 
It is calculated by dividing full equity profit by the value 
of capital invested in the firm. Full equity profit is what 
the owner of the firm would get if the activity of his firm   IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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was fully self-financed. However, attention should be 
paid to what is exactly termed as profit, and this question 
is of special importance in the case of “small scale” 
fisheries like those of the English Channel. In such 
fisheries, the economic significance of full equity profit is 
not perfectly clear due to the peculiarities of the share-
system for the rewarding of the crew (that is, the so 
called “wage costs” includes an element of profit, 
Sutinen, 1979), and the rate of profit does not look like a 
reliable economic performance indicator if one compares 
the relative profit rates by length class to the actual 
dynamics of the fleet over the last decade (Boncoeur, Le 
Gallic and Pascoe 1998). Therefore, it was decided to 
calculate another performance indicator, representing the 
net income of the skipper-owner
2 (NISO). It is defined as 
the sum of the wage he gets from his work onboard and 
the Full Equity Profit. 
 
2.2 Fishing activities’ performances 
 
Inside a complex fishery, this latter annual indicator of 
performances is derived from the results of various 
fishing activities. It was then necessary to propose 
another approach, in order to express the annual 
indicator as a function of the daily Margin on Variable 
Costs per activity (Le Gallic, Le Floch, 2000) : 
 
(1)  FC MVC e NISO m
m
m ￿  ƒ .  
 
where  NISO   : net income of the skipper-owner 
em   : number of days at sea in each activity 
m 
MVCm   : daily margin on variable costs per 
activity  m  
FC  : economic fixed costs 
 
The daily margin on variable costs per activity is the 
difference between the total revenue by activity and the 
total variable costs linked to this activity, including the 
crew costs, but excluding the wage of the skipper-owner. 
The daily margins on variable costs per activity and by 
area are presented in Table 1. They are derived from an 
economic survey of 160 skipper-owners
3, representing 10 
% of the French fleet  operating in the English Channel 
(for the methodology, see Boncoeur and Le Gallic, 1998). 
 
                                                        
2 This indicator is equal to the actual income of the skipper-owner only if 
the opportunity cost of capital employed in his firm is equal to its net 
financial costs 
3 This survey was conduct as a part of an European founded project, 
concerning the bioeconomic modelisation of the English Channel fishery. 
Fishing  
area 
fishing 
activity 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
Otter 
trawling 
 1500 2200 2800 3500   
Midwater 
trawling 
     2800  
Beam 
trawling 
   3500 3800 3100   
Scallop 
dredging 
2800 4800 4700 3400 4600   
Bivalves 
dredging 
4200  2000  3150    
Fish 
netting 
3100   2100 3200 3500 2600 
Crustacea
n netting 
3200  1800  4500    
Crustacea
n potting 
3700  2000  3200    4100 
Whelk 
potting 
  2400  3400    
Cuttlefish 
potting 
  2500    4200  3100 
Line    2100     
Seaweed  3900      
 
Table 1 : daily margin on variable costs per activity 
and per area for the 10 to 16 meter boats, in francs. 
 
In this table, one can see that high differences exist, 
either between activities or between fishing areas for a 
same activity. The problem we have to face is that some 
fleets choose the less profitable activities, which leads to 
a misallocation of the means of production (the economic 
theory expects that an efficient fleet will adjust in order 
to equalize the profitability among the various fishing 
activities, Gordon, 1954). These unexpected situations 
are called «  unprofitable situations  » in the rest of the 
text. 
 
2.3. Quantification of the “unprofitable situations”.  
 
The methodology proposed to quantify «  unprofitable 
situations » can be described as follows : for each fleet, 
we compare the daily margins on variable costs obtained 
from the activities conducted to the daily margins of 
variable costs that can be obtained from any of the 
alternative activities. An example of the methodology is 
presented in Table 2.  
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Name of the fleet 
Area of location 
Trawler-dredger  
B2 
fishing activity 
 
Fishing area 
Scallop 
dredging 
B2 
Bivalves 
dredging 
B2 
Otter 
trawling 
B2 
DMVC 
(number of days) 
4800 
(50) 
2200 
(20) 
1500 
(130) 
Daily Margin on Variable Costs of the alternative fishing activities in 
each area 
Otter trawling  B2  1500 
 
1500 1500 
D 
B3 
 
2200 2200  2200 
M 
B4 
 
2800 2800 
M 
2800 
M 
B5 
 
3500 3500 
M 
3500 
M 
Scallop dredging  B1  2800  2800 
M 
2800 
M 
B2 
 
4800 
D 
4800 
M 
4800 
M 
B3 
 
4700 4700 
M 
4700 
M 
B4 
 
3400 3400 
M 
3400 
M 
B5 
 
4600 4600 
M 
4600 
M 
Bivalves dredging  B1  4200  4200 
M 
4200 
M 
B2 
 
2200 2200 
D 
2200 
M 
B3 
 
3150 
 
3150 
M 
3150 
M 
 
Table 2: quantification of the 
“unprofitable situations” 
 
 
For the fleet analyzed – trawlers/dredgers of area B2 – 
the daily margins on variable costs of each of the activity 
done (scallops dredging, bivalves dredging, otter 
trawling) are compared with the daily margins on 
variable costs of all the alternative activities (including 
those already practiced). It’s noted D when the 
alternative activity considered is done, M when it’s more 
profitable. In this example, 20 more profitable situations 
can be identified. Following this methodology for the 
whole 10 to 16 meter fleet, it is possible to identify 691 
“unprofitable situations”. The aim of the following 
section is to explain them. 
 
 
3. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF BARRIERS TO 
ENTRY. 
 
The second stage of the methodology is to find any 
reason that allows us to understand why these situations 
continue, or why an entrepreneur do not re-allocate his 
inputs to the most profitable activities. It will refer to an 
Industrial Economic result, theconcept of barriers to 
entry. This concept can be defined as all of the 
«  obstacles » preventing the capital from flowing to the 
more profitable activities (Morvan, 1981, p.83).  
 
3.1 The costs of “moving” as a barrier to entry. 
In Table 1, daily margins on variable costs are given with 
respect to the area of fishing. However, as the boats are 
located along the coast, they are not equal from a cost to 
access to the fishing area point of view. Traditionally, 
access costs are derived from the « steaming » time, at a 
trip level. However, given the size of the boats concerned 
here, they are not able to change from a fishing area to 
another one within a trip. The costs of “moving” of the 
activity are then the sum of two factors : hotel costs  and 
travel costs. On the assumption that a boat changes from 
an area to another at least for 2 weeks (observed 
behavior), the Daily Cost of “Moving” of the activity 
(DCM) can be expressed in the following way, in francs: 
 
 (2) DCM = 600  + 50 * Bi 
 
Where 600, the fixed factor, represents the hotel cost, on 
the assumption of three men onboard, and 50* Bi, the 
variable factor representing the travel cost, takes into 
account the distance between the fishing area and the 
location area of the boat (Bi is the number of gap of 
areas). The daily costs of “moving” are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
 
 location  area 
fishing 
area 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
B1   650 700 750 800 850 
B2 650   650 700 750 800 
B3 700 650   650 700 750 
B4 750 700 650   650 700 
B5 800 750 700 650   650 
B6 850 800 750 700 650   
 
Table 3: daily cost of “moving”  from the location 
area to a fishing area, in francs. 
 
It’s then possible to recalculate the daily margin on 
variable costs of the alternative activities, net of the 
moving cost. Taking the same example as previously, the 
new results are presented in Table 4:  
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Name of the fleet 
Area of location 
Trawler-dredger  
B2 
Name of the fishing 
activity 
Fishing area 
Scallop 
dredging 
B2 
Bivalves 
dredging 
B2 
Otter 
trawling 
B2 
DMVC 
(number of days) 
4800 
(50) 
2200 
(20) 
1500 
(130) 
Daily margin on variable costs (including the moving costs ) of the 
alternative fishing activities in each area  
Otter trawling  B2  1500 
 
1500 1500 
D 
B3 
 
1550 1550  1550 
T 
B4 
 
2150 2150 
T 
2150 
M 
B5 
 
2750 2750 
M 
2750 
M 
Scallop dredging  B1  2150  2150 
T 
2150 
M 
B2 
 
4800 
D 
4800 
M 
4800 
M 
B3 
 
4050 4050 
M 
4050 
M 
B4 
 
2700 2700 
M 
2700 
M 
 
Table 4: quantification of the 
“unprofitable situations” when taking into account the 
moving costs. 
 
In this example, two “unprofitable” situations become 
profitable (noted T), as the daily margin on variable costs 
obtain from the conducted activities become higher than 
the alternative ones. 
 
For the whole fleet, it is possible to identifie 261 of the 
691 “unprofitable” situations that can be explained by 
this first barrier to entry. 
 
3.2 Uncertainty as a barrier to entry. 
 
Fishing activities are characterized by many types of 
uncertainty (e.g., see Gates, 1984). This is especially the 
case regarding the production. Yet, the second type of 
barrier to entry identified concerns the fact that 
variability in the production can prevent the skipper-
owner from reallocating his inputs (risk aversion 
behavior). In our case, we decided that all the differences 
of profitability less than 15% should be considered non-
significant. This choice is due to the fact that this 
threshold represents the average standard deviation. This 
second barrier to entry can explain eighty-eight situations 
of the 691 initial differences of profitability.  
 
3.3 Technical specificities as a barrier to entry. 
 
From a mid-term analysis, the nature of the physical 
input (the boat) must be considered as a constant. As a 
result, various types of boats are not able to practice some 
activities : for example, a boat belonging to the potters’ 
fleet won’t be able to dredge, without fundamental long 
term changes. This phenomenon can refer either to the 
problem of the non-malleability of the capital (Clark, 
Clarke and Munro, 1979) or to the question of the 
technology frontier discontinuity (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). The possibility for a given boat belonging to any 
of the fleets to practice a given activity is presented in 
Table 5, when Y (for Yes) can be read. Sixty-seven 
situations of the 691 initial “unprofitable situations” can 
be explained by this third barrier to entry. 
 
 trawler 
dredger 
Other 
dredger 
potter  netters liners  seaweed 
 
Otter 
trawling 
Y  Y  N N N N 
Midwater 
trawling 
Y  Y  N N N N 
Beam  trawling  Y  Y  N N N N 
Scallop 
dredging 
Y  Y  N N N N 
Bivalves 
dredging 
Y  Y  N N N N 
Sole  
dredging 
Y  Y  N N N N 
Crustacean 
potting 
Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
Whelk  
potting 
Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
cuttlefish 
potting 
Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
Crustacean 
netting 
Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
Fish  
netting 
Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
line  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
Seaweed  Y  Y  N N N N 
 
Table 5: Matrix of the possibility, for a given fleet, to 
practice a given fishing activity. 
 
3.4 Management measures as a barrier to entry. 
 
Different authorities, from the local level to the European 
level, manage the English Channel fisheries. National 
and European measures have mainly to do with technical 
measures (mesh size) and the setting of TAC and quotas. 
Local measures have more to do with rights to access to 
given areas or given activities, through licenses systems. 
Because they are some barriers to mobility, the latter are 
of interest for us. Two types of limited access measures 
can be distinguished  : exclusive licenses (numerus 
closus) and spatial-temporal measures. If the former 
limits directly the practice of one activity, the spatial-
temporal measures have an indirect effect. This is for 
example the case of the scallops dredging in the area B2, 
which is limited to 2 trips per week. As this activity is the 
more profitable, it is mainly chosen by the fishermen. 
However, between 2 scallop dredging trips, it’s not 
possible to allocate the fishing effort into another area,   IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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given the size of the boats, even if the activity practiced 
between the 2 scallops trip is not the most profitable. As 
a result, it is more relevant to compare the average of the 
daily margins on variable costs (given by the scallops 
dredging and any other activity) to the other daily 
margins on variable costs. One hundred fifty-seven 
situations of the 691 initial differences of profitability can 
be explained by this fourth barrier to entry. 
 
3.5 Environmental factors as a barrier to entry. 
 
In a complex fishery such as the English Channel, the 
fishermen have to make their decision under the 
constraint of the resource’s presence. This feature has 
two major consequences for the current problem, as 9 
situations of the 691 initial differences of profitability can 
be explained by this fifth barrier to entry. 
 
1)  The seasonality of the resource explains obviously 
that some species are only exploited during a given 
period of time, making the practice of less profitable 
activities for the rest of the year rational.  
2)  The impossibly of using various gear given the « tie 
coefficient  » limits the number of days of 
exploitation of some activities. It is the case for 
crustacean pots for example. The practice of less 
profitable activities can be then justified during these 
days. 
 
3.6 Social institution as a barrier to entry. 
 
Among the three types of difficulties the Schumpeterain 
entrepreneur has to face when departing from the 
«  routine  » is the « reaction of the social community » 
(Schumpeter, 1935, p.123). Through the survey, a few 
cases referring to this behavior were identified. They 
were split into two groups. The first one concerns the 
practice of activities considered as «  ecologically not 
correct », that is to say destroying for the environment, 
such as beam trawling. The second one concerns 
activities, which come in conflict with actual practices 
and «  customs  », such as netting in the area B4, 
traditionally dedicated to trawling
4. Five situations can be 
explained by this sixth barrier to entry. 
  
3.7 Information as a barrier to entry. 
The problem of information is another of the difficulties 
proposed by Schumpeter (op. cit.). In the field of fisheries 
economic, a few works focus on the question of the flow 
of information, and especially the optimal size of the 
clubs inside which the information is shared (Gates, 
1984; Wilson, 1990). Two types of informational barriers 
                                                        
4 Or scallop diving in scallop dredging areas. 
to entry are distinguished here  : the question of the 
imperfection of the information and the question of skill.  
 
The first one is linked to the fact that, in the field of 
small scale fisheries, there is a lack of official economic 
data. That means that there in no direct way for a 
fisherman to know the profitability of all the activities. 
His second best is then to follow the productions sold 
through the auction market system. However, the English 
Channel fishery is characterized by a high level of sales 
realized out of the auction market (which is perfectly 
legal), and this latter way of commercialization has a 
different impact among the activities. Yet, it is very 
difficult to know the economic performance of the 
potters, because the spider crab is accepted only in one 
auction. This institutional problem is completed by an 
information retention behavior from the operators that 
obtain the best results (or that believe to do so).  
 
The second one is the problem of the skill of the 
fisherman, which can vary between the activities. Yet, 
thanks to the development of inboard electronics, it is 
possible to trawl without the acquisition of a specific 
knowledge (Le Floch, 1998). Conversely, when the 
human capital is important compared to the physic 
capital, the skill must be considered as a barrier to entry. 
This is for example the case of the bass liners. This 
question of skill can be asked at a port organization level, 
when it concerns the commercialization conditions. For 
example, the bivalve production in area B2 is only 
realized by a few fishermen who have a niche strategy, 
but has to face with a market limitation
5. Sixty situations 
of the 691 initial differences of profitability can be 
explained by this seventh barrier to entry.  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION : THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING 
INTO ACCOUNT THE BARRIERS TO ENTRY. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the results of this 
research provide some new evidence in the debate 
concerning the economic rationality of fishermen, and 
further, in the knowledge of the producer’s micro-
behavior.  
 
Barriers to entry, as defined above, can explain 651 of 
the 691 initial unexpected differences of profitability (i.e. 
around 90%). Without prejudging the form of the 
producer’s objective function, this means that in most of 
the cases obstacles exist, justifying the current allocation 
of the fishing effort as if the producer acts as a profit 
maximisator. This result is consistent with Robinson’s 
                                                        
5 It is interesting to notice that an organization of this market is actually 
succesfully conduct by the PO concerned.    IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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one, when developing another methodology on the 
English part of the Channel (Robinson and Pascoe, 
1997). Therefore, in most of the cases, the underlying 
assumption of profit maximization appears to be relevant 
when modeling producers’ behavior. However, some 
cases remain, calling for other explanations. 
 
A first one mobilizes the concept of 
«  satisficing  approach» (Simon, 1959), which can be 
defined as the research of a minimum (or satisficing ) 
level of profitability, rather than the search for a 
maximum one. While this program remains consistent 
with the traditional framework of utility maximization, it 
requires taking into account some non-monetary 
arguments in the utility function, such as the leisure time 
or the level of the quality of life. 
 
Yet the practice of otter trawling in area B2 is often 
determined by an “occupational approach”, in the sense 
that the existence of the firm is insured by the practice of 
scallop dredging. The choice to practice or not this 
activity is then determined only by the positivity of the 
daily margin on variable costs. Thirty-three “unprofitable 
situations” can be explained by this strategy. One must 
precise that this number is a minimum, as a similar 
behavior exists, that consists for a fisherman in limiting 
the number of days of fishing as soon as he considers that 
he has earned « enough » money. The problem is that 
this latter behavior is more difficult to quantify. It is 
important to notice that this first explanation is closed to 
the « non monetary inertia » founded by several authors 
when testing the allocation choices through econometric 
models (e.g., see Bocksteal and Opaluch, 1983). 
 
A second explanation refers to the concept of 
«  satisfaction bonus  », that concerns the fact that the 
level of pleasure provide by a fishing activity is taken 
into account (e.g., see Smith, 1981). Once again this 
behavior leads to the introduction of a non-monetary 
argument in the producer’s utility function, while the loss 
of earning is compensated by a utility gain. Seven 
“unprofitable situations” can be explained by this 
strategy. 
 
The results of this research can also be useful from a 
managerial point of view. As a matter of fact, some of the 
barriers to entry, if removed, could allow a better 
allocation of the inputs, even in a mid-term prospective. 
Thus, the regulator should pay a special attention to 
them. The first barrier to entry identified is the “moving” 
cost one. As in other economic fields, where subsidies to 
mobility exist (capital and labor), it could be interesting 
to help a firm to move from an overexploited area to a 
more profitable one (or to “push” it through an incentive 
mechanism). In the long run, such a policy will all the 
more justified that the reduction of the fishing pressure 
on the overexploited stock is expected to lead to a growth 
of the captures, and further to an increase of the revenue 
which could be taxed to finance the project. The otter 
trawling in area B2, which is one of the less profitable 
fishing activities, gives an example. It can be especially 
interesting from a social point of view, because this 
activity produce a lot of negative externalities (discarding 
of crustaceans, Boncoeur, Fifas, Le Gallic, 1998). 
 
The second barrier to entry identified is the management 
measures one, which must be considered as endogenous. 
As said previously, management measures are often set 
up in order to limit the access of a given resource. If they 
can be seen as effective, when offering a better 
profitability, they lead to a problem of equity, in the sense 
that a part of the fishers are excluded from the wealth 
generated by the management measure.  
 
However the most obvious barrier to entry that can be 
looked at by the public manager concerns the flow of the 
information, at both of the levels identified above (3.7). 
Firstly, collection and diffusion of the information should 
lead to a more efficient allocation of the means of 
production, especially when taking into account the 
development of new activities in some areas (fish netting 
in the area B4). Secondly, a financial help to the 
acquisition of skill, either at the production or at the 
commercialization level should allowed a re-allocation of 
the means of production to more profitable activities 
(Bass line).  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
In any economic sector, understanding the response of 
producers to changes in economic and regulatory 
conditions is important. It is especially true in the field of 
multi-species, multi-gear, multi-area fisheries, such as 
the English Channel fisheries, where the various fishing 
activities are interrelated.  
 
As a result of a bioeconomic analysis of the English 
Channel fisheries, permanent differences of profitability 
between the various fishing activities conducted by 
homogeneous boats were identified, bringing into 
question the traditional behavioral assumptions (an 
efficient fleet is expected to adjust in order to equalize the 
profitabilities).  
 
When data are available, various econometric models can 
be tested to explain the behavior that conducts to this 
feature. However, for a large part of the fisheries around 
the world, the lack of data is the rule, calling for other 
methodologies. This paper presents one alternative   IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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methodology to explain what we have called the a priori 
“unprofitable situations” that consists in identifying the 
barriers to entry, which limit the access to the most 
profitable activities.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, this research outlines 
the fact that in few cases (10 % of the “unprofitable 
situations”), it is necessary to integrate non-monetary 
arguments in the producer’ utility function (satisfacing 
approach or satisfaction bonus). From a managerial point 
of view, it helps to identify which barriers to entry could 
be looked at by the authorities. However the methodology 
used needs improvements and calls for new 
investigations in the field of fishers’ micro-economic 
decisions, in order to determine the more relevant utility 
function as possible.  
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